



Version of attached file:
Published Version
Peer-review status of attached file:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Maude, U. (2007) ”Whole body like gone’ : Beckett and technology.’, Journal of Beckett studies., 16 (1).





The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 — Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
Maude: Becke�  and Technology
127
“whole body like gone”: Becke�  and Technology
By Ulrika Maude
Technology has a prominent presence in Samuel Beckett’s work. Beckett’s 
fascination with radio, ﬁ lm, and television are obvious examples, but the 
textual strategies of modernist writing can themselves be seen as analogous 
to technology; in Beckett, this is further perpetuated by the endless repetitions 
and permutations in the texts that, as Hugh Kenner has argued, anticipate 
information code and function as a “proto-computer-language” (96). 
Technology also has a prominent actual presence in Beckett’s writing. The 
stage and media works famously incorporate a tape recorder, a megaphone, 
and loudspeakers, as well as other prosthetic devices such as a telescope, 
spectacles, and lenses. Examples of prostheses can also be found in the prose 
works, most obviously in Molloy’s bicycle and crutches, Malone’s stick, or 
the “phial” in The Calmative, which functions as one of the several markers of 
medical technologies in Beckett’s writing (Complete Short Prose 74). In this 
essay I shall focus on the ambiguous role of technology in Beckett’s television 
plays, with particular emphasis on perceptual technologies.
In 1945, in the aftermath of World War II, the French phenomenologist 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty published his major work, Phenomenology of 
Perception, in which he argued that the body, instead of being a mere object 
in the world, forms the foundation of all human experience. For Merleau-
Ponty, we are conscious of the world through our bodies, or even more 
accurately, the body is the very condition of our having a world. Throughout 
his work, Merleau-Ponty stresses the primacy of perception, which 
functions as the interface between the self and the world, and therefore 
mediates and brings into being the relationship between the subject and 
his or her surroundings. Beckett’s work, though having signiﬁ cant points 
of divergence with Merleau-Ponty’s writing, does share his interest in 
perception, as the minute attention Beckett devotes in his prose and drama 
to the experience of seeing, hearing, and touching testiﬁ es. One could even 
characterize some of Beckett’s works as phenomenological reductions into 
the nature and functioning of the various senses.
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As Karl Marx observed in Das Kapital, originally published in 1867, the 
human senses have a history, and one could argue that one of the most radical 
paradigm shifts in that history occurred during the so-called second Industrial 
Revolution in which major perceptual technologies, such as the telephone, the 
gramophone, photography, and cinematography entered popular consumption. 
Furthermore, such groundbreaking visualizing techniques as the X-ray, 
invented in 1895 by Wilhelm Röntgen, revolutionized medical practices, 
which also had a radical impact on the popular imagination. As Ezra Pound 
argued: “You can no more take machines out of the modern mind, than you can 
take the shield of Achilles out of the Iliad” (77). 
One of the recurrent ways of making sense of new technologies has been 
to conceptualize them precisely in relation to the human body, as forms of 
prosthetic devices that function either as instances of organ- or sensory-
extension, in a positive sense, or as a form of organ replacement, to make up 
for an individual deﬁ ciency or lack.1 An example of the former would be the 
telephone, which enhances the perceptual powers of the human ear, and indeed 
was modeled on the anatomy of the ear, with its vibrating tympanum. As an 
example of a technological device that was originally designed to supplement 
a lack one could offer the typewriter, ﬁ rst devised in order to enable the blind 
to write. Freud, one of the most famous early commentators on technology, 
indeed argued that “[w]ith every tool man is perfecting his own organs, whether 
motor or sensory, or is removing the limits to their functioning” (279). In 1930, 
Freud wrote in his now seminal essay, Civilization and Its Discontents:
Man has, as it were, become a kind of prosthetic God. When 
he puts on all his auxiliary organs he is truly magniﬁ cent; but 
those organs have not grown on to him and they still give him 
much trouble at times. (280)
Beckett, whose works pay minute attention to both different forms of 
perception and technology, examines―particularly in his mature work―the 
manner in which these auxiliary organs change the way in which we see, hear, 
and more generally perceive the world, producing in us a double-perception 
that differs from earlier modes of perceiving. If perception establishes our 
relationship to the world, then perceptual technologies, by default, have an 
impact on that relationship, and Beckett, ever attuned to these questions, sets 
out to examine this impact. 
Beckett’s television plays and his late drama are famous for the dissociation of 
protagonist from voice: Eh Joe, Ghost Trio, and …but the clouds…, as well as 
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the stage plays That Time, Footfalls, and Rockaby, are a few examples. Critics 
have proposed a number of ways of approaching this dissociation or doubling 
in Beckett’s drama, suggesting, for instance, that the dissociated voices stage 
the inner monologue of the self-reﬂ exive mind. However, especially in cases 
in which the monologue is overtly and explicitly technologically mediated, 
as in the case of Ghost Trio, these kinds of interpretations pose a number of 
problems. What I shall argue instead, then, is that these plays stage an analysis 
of the manner in which perceptual technologies produce in us a bifurcation or 
double take of different modes of perception.
Vision provides perhaps the most prominent example of the impact of new 
technologies on the way we perceive the world, and a brief summary of the 
history of vision reveals that “[a]t least since Plato,” vision and reason have 
been seen to be virtually analogous to one another (Connor, “Between” 91). For 
Aristotle, for instance, sight was the supreme sense because it resembled the 
intellect most closely, “by virtue of the relative immateriality of its knowing” 
(Flynn 274). The association of sight with reason only became heightened 
in Cartesian thought. In fact, in his essay “The Age of the World Picture,” 
Heidegger characterized the essence of modernity itself as the age in which the 
world is “conceived and grasped as picture” (129).
Without delving into this issue too deeply in this context, the association of 
vision with knowledge does have a long tradition in Western thought. This 
association, however, while not exactly changed in the last one hundred years 
or so, does become modiﬁ ed with the advent of new technologies, and in 
particular, of course, technologies of perception, those prosthetic devices that 
Freud and others―one could mention, for instance, the media critic Marshall 
McLuhan―have characterized as enhancing the human senses.
In the second half of the nineteenth century, or more accurately toward its 
end, new technologies emerged that were designed to “chart, explore, and 
record sensory phenomena that [it] had never been possible to perceive” 
(Danius 19). Etienne-Jules Marey’s stop-motion photographs of ﬂ ying birds 
and running horses turned physiological action invisible to the human eye into 
visual records and data (Danius 19). Early photographic procedures had not 
been “sensitive enough to record moving subjects,” and “anything that moved 
produced blur on [the] silver plate” (Braun 43). To study the ﬂ ight of birds, 
Marey invented a camera in 1882 with magazine plates that recorded a series 
of photographs; the pictures could then be combined to represent movements. 
Marey’s chronophotographs, developed in 1888, in turn, consisted of multiple 
exposures on single glass plates and strips of ﬁ lm that passed automatically 
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through a camera of his own design. Chronophotography had an important 
impact on science, for instance studies of muscle function. It also left its mark 
on the arts, such as twentieth-century photography; many even consider Marey 
the real inventor of motion ﬁ lm. In 1894, Marey adapted the motion-picture 
camera to the microscope, and subsequently inaugurated microscopic ﬁ lm, 
which further enhanced the discrepancy between the now-fallible human eye 
and technologically mediated vision.
Röntgen’s development of the X-ray exposed the human skeleton and other 
organs within the now living body. The device, which for the ﬁ rst time turned 
the body inside out without surgical intervention, made human beings more 
aware of their state of embodied being by revealing physiological processes 
and detailed anatomical information previously unavailable in living subjects. 
X-rays, furthermore, not only collapsed the distinction between the inside 
and the outside of the body, but also between “the public and the private; 
specialized knowledge and popular fantasy; and scientiﬁ c discourse, high 
art, and popular culture” (Cartwright 107). However, the X-ray and other 
imaging techniques that followed in its wake also somewhat problematically 
reproduced two-dimensional images of the body that transformed or reduced 
the living organism into pixels, graphs, and information code, suggesting the 
body’s rewritability. Imaging techniques therefore had a drastic and duplicitous 
impact on the way in which twentieth-century artists, intellectuals, and the 
popular imagination conceived of the question of embodiment.
Both Marey’s and Röntgen’s methods enhanced the human eye and appropriated 
scopic ideas of knowledge, while simultaneously underscoring the limitations 
and lack in human, embodied vision. The radical, new visual technologies 
opened up a gap between subjective, human, ultimately fallible vision, and the 
so-called objective vision of technology and visual inscription methods. This 
awareness of the limitations of human vision had already begun in the ﬁ rst 
half of the nineteenth century, and even the end of the eighteenth, with studies 
on such issues as retinal afterimages, as Jonathan Crary has argued. However, 
ﬁ gures such as Goethe, in the early nineteenth century, treated the topic much 
more thoroughly than previous researchers had done. The importance of 
afterimages was that they revealed “the presence of sensation in the absence of 
stimulus”―in other words, that the eye, on occasion, perceived things that were 
not there (Crary 98).2 Several studies were conducted, for instance, to measure 
afterimages, and although their length varied according to circumstance, the 
discovery was made that the images lasted, on average, one third of a second. 
These kinds of revelations, in turn, triggered the development of a number of 
devices, initially for the “purposes of scientiﬁ c observation but . . . quickly 
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converted into forms of popular entertainment” such as the “thaumatrope 
(literally, ‘wonder-turner’) ﬁ rst popularized in London by Dr. John Paris in 
1825” (Crary 104-05). Another gadget was the stereoscope that produced three-
dimensional images by emulating the functioning of human vision.
The human eye now appeared deﬁ cient and limited in its abilities in comparison 
with new technologically enhanced methods of seeing and recording sensory 
data, and Beckett’s work documents this new experience of seeing. Molloy, 
in the Trilogy, wanders in a landscape he ﬁ nds treacherous and alien, one that 
he can no longer master by casting his gaze over it. Molloy has to conclude, 
for instance, that even though certain objects on the horizon may appear to be 
close, in reality they are probably much farther than the subject suspects, and 
“often where only one escarpment is discerned, and one crest, in reality there 
are two, two escarpments, two crests, riven by a valley” (Molloy 11).
The human eye and the information it renders is perspectival, and perception, 
memory, and imagination have a tendency to exchange functions and merge into 
one. In Beckett’s 1946 novella, The Calmative, the verb “to see,” in its different 
declinations, is mentioned seventeen times, the verb “to look” ﬁ ve times, and 
the verbs “to gaze,” “to eye,” and “to focus” each appear twice. Amongst 
further vision-related verbs in the novella ﬁ gure “to appear,” “to loom,” and “to 
shine”―all within the space of a sixteen-page text. There are also a number of 
visual adjectives, such as “blind,” “glittering,” and “radiant” (CSP 62, 73, 75). 
The emphasis on vision, furthermore, is only heightened by repeated references 
to a peculiar silence, and to the recurrent failure of vocal articulation. The 
novella, in other words, appears very much like a phenomenological reduction 
or analysis into the nature of visual experience. When the narrator comes 
across the ramparts, he says, “Cyclopean and crenellated, standing out faintly 
against a sky scarcely less sombre, they did not seem in ruins, viewed from 
mine, but were, to my certain knowledge” (CSP 63). Rather than providing the 
narrator access to an instantaneous comprehension of the scene, vision is from 
the outset described as prone to miscalculations. A distinction is made between 
what the eye sees and the narrator knows, hence problematizing the received 
relationship between vision and rationality. The narrator mentions the stars 
he sees on the horizon, and again distances sight from reason by pointing out 
that they are “not to be confused with the ﬁ res men light, at night, or that go 
alight alone,” for both ﬁ res and stars, seen from the narrator’s vantage point, 
look all too similar (CSP 69). In The End, another one of the 1946 novellas 
with a striking emphasis on vision, Beckett’s narrator mentions the sky, which 
he gazes at “without focussing it, for why focus it? Most of the time it was a 
mixture of white, blue and grey, and then at evening all the evening colours” 
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(CSP 93). From his abode, the narrator says, “the eyes rose to a confusion 
of low houses, wasteland, horadings, chimneys, steeples and towers” (CSP
95). Again, a coherent whole refuses to present itself; instead, the human eye 
encounters only “confusion” (CSP 95). When the narrator reaches the river, 
he retorts, “Here all seemed at ﬁ rst sight more or less as I had left it. But if I 
had looked more closely I would doubtless have discovered many changes. 
And indeed I subsequently did so” (CSP 82). The knowledge the human eye 
renders is inaccurate and misleading; in fact, not really knowledge at all. In 
the 1964 Film, Beckett uses a special gauze ﬁ lter to render the experience 
of blurred, imperfect eyesight. Beckett, that is to say, is acutely aware of the 
limitations of the human eye. As David Michael Levin has argued, writing 
about the phenomenology of vision:
What happens when we stare intensely at something? Instead 
of clear and distinct perception, blurring and confusion; 
instead of fulﬁ llment, the eyes lose their sight, veiled in tears; 
instead of stability and ﬁ xation at the far end of the gaze, we 
ﬁ nd a chaos of shifting, jerking forms as the object of focus 
violently tears itself away from the hold of the gaze. (69)
Beckett’s 1975 television play, Ghost Trio, is considered by many to be his 
ﬁ nest work for television. Michael Billington characterized the play as “a 
mesmeric piece of painting for the TV” (Guardian), and it offers one of the 
most probing analyses of the new bifurcated experience of seeing. As critics 
such as Crary and Danius have observed, technology, while underscoring 
the limitations of the human eye, also liberates it from its association with 
knowledge, enabling a more sensuous, aestheticized experience of vision. 
This is reﬂ ected in the multiple movements in the visual arts modernity has 
experienced―impressionism, post-impressionism, expressionism, and so 
forth―that have tended to privilege color over line and beauty over fact: 
Beckett’s numerous writings on the visual arts reﬂ ect his awareness of and 
interest in these new modes of seeing. 
Modernist art works, in other words, begin to explore the subjective nature 
of perceptual experience. Indeed, the opening shots of Ghost Trio, which 
Daniel Albright describes as “a game with superimposed rectangles” (136), 
bear a closer resemblance to a Mondrian than to modern drama. “Compared 
to the earlier Film and Eh Joe, the setting has been radically reduced. Whereas 
Film and Eh Joe offer lit spaces that include discernable naturalist details, 
furniture, windows, and doors that however strangely shaped may represent 
an individualised setting,” Ghost Trio “shows a rectangular box, dominated 
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by unnaturally even and smooth grey rectangles, in ﬂ oor, wall, door, window, 
mirror, pallet, pillow” (Voigts-Virchow, “Exhausted” 229-30). 
Indeed, in the 1977 Süddeutscher Rundfunk production Geister Trio, which 
Beckett himself directed, even the Male Figure is at ﬁ rst indistinguishable 
from the objects in the room, and appears himself to form but yet another 
rectangle (Voigts-Virchow, “Exhausted” 230). The fact that the Male Figure 
is unrecognizable as such until the camera zooms in at the end of act 1 once 
again draws attention to the miscalculations of the human eye. Other objects, 
too, such as the cassette, Beckett’s directions make clear, are at ﬁ rst “not 
identiﬁ able at this range” (CDW 409). In fact, the “props are so schematically 
represented that a voice-over is needed to conﬁ rm their identity” (Prieto); 
there is in Ghost Trio “a deliberate play on the disparity between ‘looking’ 
and ‘knowing’ that leaves the spectator aware of the strangeness and the 
ambiguity of what he is observing” (Knowlson, “Ghost Trio” 198). The female 
voice of the play not only urges the spectator to “Look” (Complete Dramatic 
Works 408), but to “look closer” (CDW 408), and to “Look again” (CDW 408, 
409). As Jonathan Kalb has observed, “The imperative ‘look again’ in part 
one applies not only to the rectangles but also to the rest of the play and, by 
extension, to the other television plays. . . . ‘look again’, Beckett seems to say, 
not only at the picture at hand but at the way you looked the ﬁ rst time, at how 
that may have been inadequate” (“Mediated” 140). Ghost Trio, then, is yet 
another “example of Beckett incorporating the viewer’s process of viewing 
into his drama” (“Mediated” 140).
Several critics have drawn attention to Ghost Trio’s melodramatic subtext, 
and Sydney Homan, James Knowlson, and others have pointed out that the 
play’s working title was “Tryst,” which only heightens our sense of the play’s 
sentimental subject matter, namely, that of the Male Figure waiting for a 
woman who never appears. When Beckett directed the play at Süddeutscher 
Rundfunk in Stuttgart, Reinhart Müller-Freienfels, who was the director of 
SDR at the time, recalls looking, together with Beckett and in accordance with 
his wishes, for a boy with “a moving face” for the German production of the 
play (Müller-Freienfels).3
The play is divided into three acts that Beckett names “Pre-action,” “Action,” 
and “Re-action.” In the ﬁ rst two acts, “The disembodied female voice . . . 
uses extradiegetic direct access: it directs the representation and equates the 
camera eye and the viewer’s eye by giving orders to the viewer that the camera 
vicariously obeys” (Voigts-Virchow, “Face-Values” 125).4 The fact that what 
the audience sees in act 2 is repeated in act 3 partly explains the title of the third 
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act, “Re-action.” The act is also a “reaction,” however, for what the audience 
now sees, as Eric Prieto has suggested, also “changes drastically . . . [for] the 
camera begins to alternate between a long view of the entire room and views 
that are taken from the ﬁ rst-person perspective of F, as if we were looking 
through his eyes” (Prieto). 
There is, in other words, a discrepancy between Ghost Trio’s austere, geometric 
set with its embedded rectangles, and the play’s sentimental subject matter, that 
of a man waiting for a woman who never appears. This discrepancy is reﬂ ected 
in the two different types of focalization we encounter in the play: that of the 
camera, and that of F; external and internal or extradiegetic and intradiegetic, 
to use terms familiar from ﬁ lm theory.
Something similar is at stake in the sound track of Ghost Trio. The voice in the 
play foregrounds its own technologically mediated quality, not only by having 
a “ﬂ at and unearthly” tone, as Knowlson has observed (Damned 621), but also 
by explicitly stating, in the opening lines of the play:
Good evening. Mine is a faint voice. Kindly tune accordingly. 
[Pause.] Good evening. Mine is a faint voice. Kindly tune 
accordingly. [Pause.] It will not be raised, or lowered, 
whatever happens. (CDW 408)
Beckett made clear from the start of the play that the voice is technologically 
mediated. As in the case of the camera, in the ﬁ rst two acts of the play, it will 
not render what F, the Male Figure, hears, but only the objectively mediated 
voice in all its ﬂ atness and lack of depth. Nor will it, unlike the human 
voice, show affect, “whatever happens” (CDW 408). As Daniel Albright has 
suggested, “[m]any of the voices in Beckett’s late plays seem determined to 
unvoice themselves” (134), and the “unvoicing” here has its roots in Beckett’s 
interest in technology. Never once do we hear what F thinks he hears, namely 
the sound of the absent woman that triggers his movements and prompts him 
to look behind door and window. However, in act 3, as Prieto has argued: 
not only are we able to hear the music from A, and for longer 
periods of time, but we also hear the creaks of the door and 
window as they open or close, and rain falling outside the 
window. It is also at this point that the camera begins to [render] 
the ﬁ rst-person perspective of F, showing us the view out of 
the window and the appearance of the boy at the door. (Prieto) 
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Each of these views may also be available to F in act 2, but because the 
focalization is that of the camera, we do not see what F sees. Beckett is 
foregrounding the difference and discrepancy between the human eye 
and ear, which are tinged with emotion, memory, and imagination, and the 
objective camera eye and recorded voice, which give us the clinical, objective 
“truth.” The various manuscript versions of Ghost Trio, held at the Beckett 
International Foundation Archives, highlight this point. Especially striking is 
the ﬁ rst holograph manuscript, MS 1519/1, which reveals the importance of 
the camera’s perspective from the very early stages of the play’s conception. 
Beckett plans each camera move, whether “close up,” “near shot,” or “fade 
out” with meticulous detail, particularly in the so-called “III SYNOPSIS.” 
The length, in seconds, of each shot, is also included in the manuscript. This 
attention to camera moves, though revised, ﬁ nds its way through the various 
manuscript drafts into the ﬁ nal version of the play.  
In RUL MS 1519/3, a carbon typescript of Ghost Trio entitled “Notes on 
Tryst,” Beckett states, in the instructions for the camera, “Once set for shot it 
should not explore, simply stare. It stops and stares, mainly in vain.”5 Human 
vision, in contrast, may have more in common with touch than static staring. 
Merleau-Ponty writes:
From the point of view of my body I never see as equal the 
six sides of the cube, even if it is made of glass, and yet the 
word “cube” has a meaning; the cube itself, the cube in reality, 
beyond its sensible appearances, has its six equal sides. As I 
move round it, I see the front face, hitherto a square, change 
its shape, then disappear, while the other sides come into view 
and one by one become squares. (203)
The eye, in Merleau-Ponty’s treatment of vision, explores the various sides 
of the cube in a temporal manner, moving around its surface successively, as 
in a caress. Beckett’s treatment of human vision, in his various works, seems 
to attest to a similar kind of temporal, exploratory mode of seeing, that F also 
engages in in acts 2 (“Action”) and 3 (“Re-action”) of Ghost Trio. 
In this way, Beckett stages the manner in which perceptual technologies, by 
being more objective, stark, and “reliable” than the human eye and ear, not only 
differ from but perhaps also liberate human perception from its association with 
rationality and objectivity, freeing it for sensuous, subjective, and aestheticized 
perceptual experience. If technology does the quantiﬁ able seeing and hearing 
for us, human perception is freed for qualitative sensory experience. 
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…but the clouds…, Ghost Trio’s companion piece, shares the former play’s 
emphasis on human, vulnerable vision, for like F in Ghost Trio, M in the 1977 
BBC version of …but the clouds… is virtually indistinguishable as a human 
ﬁ gure in the opening shot of the play, in which he is “sitting on invisible stool 
bowed over invisible table” (CDW 417). In the 1977 Süddeutscher Rundfunk 
version of the play, …nur noch Gewölk…, which Beckett directed in Stuttgart, 
“the basic shot of M bent over the table, which was already hard to recognize 
as a human ﬁ gure in the BBC version, is enlarged even further so that it appears 
only as an obscure shape; one sees it initially as an abstract composition and 
only gradually comes to read it as a partial view of a man after the camera 
returns to it ﬁ fteen times” (Kalb, Beckett 114-15). The subjective, fragile 
nature of M’s own visions of W, the woman V begs to appear, is highlighted 
in V’s line, “For had she never once appeared, in all that time, would I have, 
could I have, gone on begging, all that time?” (CDW 420). 
In “The Tower” (1928), which famously inspired Beckett to write …but the 
clouds…, William Butler Yeats writes:
Never had I more
Excited, passionate, fantastical
Imagination, nor an ear and eye
That more expected the impossible – (95-96)
An eye and ear that expect the impossible are what Ghost Trio and ...but the 
clouds… stage, for both plays are about the subjective, yearning human eye 
and ear. Knowlson, writing about the largo of Beethoven’s Piano Trio No. 5 
that Beckett chose for the music in Ghost Trio, observes that the bars: 
capture a sense of tense expectation which may be regarded 
as one of the main links between Beethoven’s dark motifs and 
the play which, until very late in its preparation, Beckett had 
entitled Tryst. Before the end of the movement there is even a 
slight lightening of mood and a hint of hopefulness . . . which 
may well encourage the waiting ﬁ gure to persist with his vigil 
and perhaps partially explain the strange, haunted, half-smile 
that ﬂ ickered on the face of the actor, Klaus Herm, at the end 
of Beckett’s production. (“Ghost Trio” 201)
The cassette player and the Beethoven largo that F so intently listens to are 
not only further examples of the now qualitative nature of human perception, 
they also point, as so many of Beckett’s plays, to the autonomization of the 
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senses, triggered percisely by such devices as the telephone, gramophone, and 
audiotape, that no longer require the direct involvement of the full sensorium.
Ghost Trio and …but the clouds… can be read as examinations into the manner 
in which technological inscription methods such as cameras, recording devices, 
and various imaging techniques that do the seeing and hearing for us produce 
in us a double-perception that differs from earlier modes of perceiving. For 
Beckett’s late television plays, in their historicization of perception, suggest 
that while technologically mediated ways of seeing and hearing differ from 
the human eye and ear, they also liberate the senses from their association with 
rationality, and in the process, transform our perception of the world.
Notes
1. See, for instance, Armstrong 77-105.
2. Beckett himself refers to afterimages in Murphy and Watt. I owe this point to Chris 
Ackerley and Marcel Fernandes’s hitherto unpublished “’By Christ! He Did Die’: Medical 
Misadventures in the Works of Samuel Beckett.”
3. This information is from Müller-Freienfels’s unpublished manuscript, entitled “Samuel 
Beckett: ‘We Do It to Have Fun Together.’ (Erinnerungen an Beckett in Stuttgart),” held at 
Südwestrundfunk archives. I am indebted to Dr. Jörg Hucklenbroich who kindly granted me 
access to this material. Warm thanks are also due to Stephan Spering for his generous help and 
assistance at SWR.
4. Voigts-Virchow’s point, however, is not entirely accurate, for as Knowlson has 
observed, on occasion, V either “makes mistakes and gets the order wrong or she exercises 
uncertain control over [F]” (“Ghost Trio” 198). For a meticulous mapping of the BBC and 
SDR productions of the play, see Knowlson’s essay “Ghost Trio/ Geister Trio.”
5. I am grateful to The Beckett International Foundation, Reading University Library for 
permission to quote from this manuscript.
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